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ABSTRACT 
In several articles published in the 1990s, de Long and Summers argued that 
investment in producer durables had a high propensity to generate externalities in 
using industries, resulting in a systematic and substantial divergence between its 
social and private return. They maintained, moreover, that this was not the case 
for structures investment. Together, these claims constitute the equipment 
hypothesis.  This paper explores the degree to which the history of U.S. economic 
growth in the twentieth century supports it.  
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The Equipment Hypothesis and U.S. Economic Growth 
Introduction 
Equipment – producer durables – has long enjoyed a privileged position in thinking 
about economic growth, in spite of the fact that throughout most of recorded economic 
history its importance has been dwarfed by structures both in flows of net investment and 
in shares of the capital stock (Field, 1985).  Machinery, with its roots in mechanical and 
electrical engineering, its intricacies, its interplay of finely wrought moving or changing 
parts, may simply be more interesting than structures to the typical economist.   
But there is a serious economic argument as to why we should pay special attention 
to machinery.  Many scholars believe that machinery, unlike structures, is an important 
carrier of or stimulus for the type of technological change that shows up in measures of 
total factor productivity growth. This means that machinery is particularly likely to 
generate uncompensated spillover effects in using sectors – uncompensated in the sense 
that the producers of the machinery do not reap the full benefit of the incremental 
contribution to value added for which their product is responsible. These contributions 
can be thought of as the consequence of positive production externalities.  
Another way of stating this is that there is a divergence between the private and 
social return to investment in machinery, which in turn leads to the conclusion that tax 
policies favoring equipment (investment credits, accelerated depreciation schedules) are 
desirable. If growth is the objective, it follows that equipment investment should be 
subsidized, either directly or through tax policy, and organizations contributing to the 
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formation of different types of capital should not face a level playing field.  In particular, 
those producing equipment, and their customers, should be favored.    
The equipment hypothesis has deep roots in classic works in economic theory 
which placed great emphasis on the productivity implications of mechanical innovations, 
particularly in manufacturing.  It received renewed attention in the early 1990s as the 
result of a series of papers by De Long and Summers (De Long and Summers, 1991, 
1992; De Long 1992).  Although these papers are often understood to be concerned 
primarily with developing economies, the authors viewed their conclusions as as 
applicable to developed countries as to those aspiring to become so.  It is appropriate, 
therefore, to reexamine what the economic history of the world’s largest developed 
economy tells us about the hypothesis. 
The Modern Statement of the Equipment Hypothesis 
De Long and Summers’ 1991 article reported the results of cross country 
regressions on data from 61 countries over the years 1960-1985. These regressions 
showed a statistical relationship between the share of equipment investment in GDP and 
the rate of growth of output per hour.  Based on these data, they maintained that  
… the social rate of return on equipment investment is 30 percent per year, or 
higher.  Much of this return is not captured by private investors….  The gains from 
raising equipment investment through tax or other incentives dwarf losses from any 
nonneutralities that would result. A 20 percent wedge between the social return to 
equipment and other investments has implications for all policies affecting saving 
and capital allocations (1991, p. 485). 
This passage contains two empirical claims and a policy implication:  that the social 
return to equipment investment is high, that it is largely uncompensated, and that it 
warrants subsidization.  Elsewhere in the paper De Long and Summers make clear their 
view that this 30 percent social return applies to advanced as well as developing 
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economies,1 and their belief in an asymmetry between the effects on growth of 
equipment investment as opposed to investment in structures.2 
The De Long and Summer analysis, as well as that of this paper, is developed 
within the context of a version of the Solow growth model and the growth accounting 
tradition with which it is associated (Abramovitz, 1956; Solow, 1957).    De Long and 
Summers maintained that some types of investment – equipment investment -- 
contributed to the growth of the residual in a way that investment in structures did not.  
They intended their work as a counter to the “investment pessimism” implied by the 
original Abramovitz and Solow analyses which attributed a substantial portion of growth 
to factors other than inputs conventionally measured.  If Abramovitz and Solow were 
right, then one couldn’t necessarily expect much boost to economic growth from boosting 
saving rates and physical capital accumulation.  
The De Long and Summers analysis implied that while this pessimism might be 
warranted for the accumulation of structures, it was not so for equipment. Within the 
standard growth accounting framework, focusing only on the rate of equipment 
accumulation (weighted by its share in national income) would understate the 
contribution to growth of such investment because it would not take into account the role 
of new producer durables in generating positive production externalities, which would 
also be responsible for part of the increase of the residual.  This double barreled impact 
on growth was not applicable, in contrast, to that portion of capital accumulation 
associated with investment in structures. 
1 “We interpret our results as suggesting that the social return to equipment investment in well functioning 
market economies is on the order of 30 percent per year”  (De Long and Summers, 1991, p. 446). 
2  “We see no reason to expect that investments in structures should carry with them the same external
effects as plausibly attach to investments in equipment” (1991, p. 480). 
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In 1992, following additional empirical work, De Long and Summers reduced their 
estimate of the social rate of return to equipment investment from 30 to 20 percent, but 
reaffirmed the earlier conclusions, and in particular the applicability of these conclusions 
to advanced countries such as the United States.3   Even if the estimated wedge between 
the total return to equipment investment and that of other investments had been 10 rather 
than 20 percentage points, this would still have been a very large wedge.4  If the spillover 
effects were as large as De Long and Summers suggested, they would have justified far 
more than a “modest” bias toward equipment investment.   If we truly believed these 
numbers, the government should have been sending out checks – and they should have 
been large --  to firms and perhaps even households installing more equipment.  
Obviously, there are companies, including many in Silicon Valley, who would have 
found this a very congenial policy. 
De Long and Summers wrote at the start of the 1990s, at the beginning of the 
longest economic expansion in U.S. economic history.  During this boom, the U.S. 
experienced a continued decline in the relative price of equipment, led by the operation of 
Moore’s law in computers and semiconductors, and a surge in physical capital formation 
coinciding with a rising share of equipment in gross and net capital formation and in the 
capital stock.  Finally, after 1995, this was matched by an acceleration in both labor and 
                                                 
3 “Growth -- measured by labor or by TFP – is as tied to high equipment investment for rich countries as it 
it for newly industrializing ones…. Equipment investment appears to have a very high net social return – in 
the range of 20 percent per year; more than half of this comes from increased TFP. We conclude that the 
macroeconomic data give no evidence that poorer countries benefit more from high rates of equipment 
investment than do richer countries.  This suggests, significantly, large external benefits from equipment 
investment, even in rich economies.  We conclude that policies that tilt the playing field against equipment 
investment are likely to be disastrous and that a strong case exists for at least a modest bias in favor of 
equipment investment  (De Long and Summers, 1992, p. 159). 
4A 10 percentage point decline in one year in the estimated social return to equipment investment is quite 
remarkable in itself.  Note that De Long (1992, p. 322) interpreted his longitudinal – cross sectional 
analysis of advanced economy growth  as suggesting a rate of return to machinery investment of over 50 
percent per year or more, returns that “dwarf the profits that investors in the capital goods are able to 
appropriate directly.”  He acknowledged, however, that this estimate might be too high. 
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total factor productivity growth (see Field, 2006a).  From the vantage point of 2000, with 
the NASDAQ approaching its all time high, the coincidence of rising equipment 
investment and an increase in the growth rate of the residual appeared to confirm the 
validity of the equipment hypothesis, as well perhaps as justify stratospheric stock 
valuations. 
But the NASDAQ remained only briefly at its March high of 5,048, and more than 
five year out from the end of the boom – remained at more modest levels.5 There is now 
greater receptivity to a more nuanced view of the impact of IT investment.  It is certainly 
possible that the information technology revolution may still have its best days ahead.  
But the deflation of tech stock prices, and the memories of the hype associated with their 
inflation, are reminders that we are perhaps better served by focusing more attention on 
what has in fact happened and can be documented in the data, as opposed to what we 
believe may happen, or hope will happen. 
What Can We Learn from the Economic History of the United States? 
Many analyses of recent productivity advance, if they look back in history at all, do 
so no further than 1948, the start date for the productivity series maintained by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics.  This paper, as does De Long and Summers 1992 and De 
Long 1992, takes a longer view, with particular focus in my case on the interwar period.   
It argues, based on a reconsideration of the patterns of economic growth, investment, and 
technical change in the United States between 1919 and 2000, that the social returns to 
equipment investment claimed as a general principle by De Long and Summers are too 
high. And it argues that the claimed asymmetry between the ability of equipment as 
opposed to structures investment to generate TFP growth is not supported by the 
                                                 
5 In the Fall 2005, the NASDAQ remained remained at roughly 40 percent of its peak value. 
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historical record.  The rise in equipment investment and its share of total investment in 
the United States represents a trend that has been proceeding steadily since the end of the 
Second World War.  It has coincided, rather surprisingly, with a long term downward 
trend in TFP growth, as the economy moved away from the very rapid advances 
registered for the private nonfarm economy during the interwar period. 
Unlike some of the IT prophets who emerged later in the 1990s, the De Long and 
Summers work was based on quantitative analysis, not anecdotal evidence.   De Long and 
Summers (1991) examined data for 61 countries over the period 1960-85.  De Long and 
Summers (1992) extended the cross country investigation backward to 1950 and forward 
to 1990.  De Long (1992) analyzed a pooled cross section time series6 analysis of six 
advanced countries extending back to 1870. 
 My purpose here is not to provide a comprehensive critical analysis of the post 
1950 econometric work and its interpretation, which has already been done by others.   
Auerbach, Hasset, and Oliner (1994), for example, argued that the 1991 DeLong and 
Summers results were statistical artifacts resulting from the inclusion of outliers 
(particularly the diamond mining country of Botswana, which had the highest equipment 
to GDP ratio).  More generally, the critics argued, it was inappropriate to include high 
income, low income and newly industrializing economies in the same regression, since 
not all of these countries had access to the same production possibilities as advanced 
nations; many indeed were in the process of moving toward that access.   Most 
importantly, Auerbach et al questioned the relevance of the conclusions for the United 
States:  in particular that equipment warranted special tax treatment because the 
spillovers meant that it had a higher social than private return.  De Long (1992), which 
                                                 
6 The time series are series of growth rates over specified business cycle intervals. 
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examined the performance of six advanced countries over more than a century, can be 
seen in part as an anticipatory response to the type of objections raised by Auerbach et. 
al. 
My interest is in what countries aspiring to be developed can learn from the 
economic history of the world’s largest and most important twentieth century economy, 
and in how our history should inform tax policies in advanced countries.   In 1992, De 
Long and Summers wrote that “… in assessing the determinants of growth, there is little 
alternative to examining natural experiments provided by the different policies, 
investment outcomes, and growth rates found in various different nations” (1992, p. 158).  
This paper explores the lessons to be learned from the natural experiments provided in  
different time periods in the twentieth century in the United States. 
De Long also undertook longitudinal analysis.  His 1992 paper examined advanced 
performance in six countries over eight time intervals spanning the years 1870 to 1980: 
1870 to 1885, 1885 to 1900, 1900 to 1913, 1913 to 1929, 1929 to 1938, 1938 to 1950, 
1950 to 1965, and 1965 to 1980.  He acknowledged a goal of examining growth rather 
than cyclical phenomenon, remarking that “the 15 year frequency of observation, with 
some dates offset to better match the cycle and the eras of war and peace, was chosen to 
reveal long run shifts in growth rates instead of short run cyclical fluctuations” (De Long, 
1992, p. 309).   
The standard in growth accounting is to restrict growth rate calculations as closely 
as possible to peak to peak measures.  The choice of start and stop dates for calculations 
of growth rates is quite important because of the well known and sometimes quite 
powerful cyclical influences on productivity advance.  At least with respect to the United 
 8
States, and probably for other countries, De Long’s intervals deviate substantially from 
this standard.  It is largely by accident that many of his beginning and end points are 
business cycle peaks.  
The choice of 1938 as a benchmark date is particularly unfortunate. Unemployment 
in the United States in 1938 was 19.1 percent, the worst performance in the entire 
twentieth century save 1932-35.  1929 to 1938 is therefore a peak to trough calculation, 
and 1938 to 1950 approximately a trough to peak calculation.7  The choice of beginning 
and end points makes a big difference in productivity growth calculations.  TFP growth 
in the private nonfarm economy between 1929 and 1938 was 1.55 percent per year, as 
compared with an unadjusted rate of 2.31 percent per year between 1929 and 1941 (Field, 
2003, 2005b, 2006a, 2006b).8  1938 to 1948 growth was 2.28 percent per year (even 
higher to 1950, the end year used by De Long), as opposed to the 1.29 percent per year 
one measures between 1941 and 1948 (see Field, 2003; Kendrick, 1961, Table A-XXIII).  
The fact that Maddison chose 1938 as a break point in many of his calculations, perhaps 
because of availability of data in a variety of countries, and the fact that it was the last 
year before war in Europe, cannot be grounds for ignoring these cyclical influences, 
particularly in analyses of the economic history of the United States.   
Six Peak to Peak Episodes, 1919-2000 
In this work I analyze six peak to peacetime peak periods in U.S. economic history 
for which relatively complete data can be obtained: 1919-1929, 1929-1941, 1941-1948, 
1948-1973, 1973-1989, and 1989-2000.  Most of the beginning and end dates will be 
                                                 
7 1948 is a more appropriate peak for the U.S.; unemployment was 3.8 percent, as compared with  5.3 
percent in 1950. 
8 Because productivity growth was strongly procyclical during the Depression years, a cyclical adjustment 
to the 1941 level raises the estimated TFP growth rate between 1929 and 1941 and, correspondingly, 
lowers it between 1941 and 1948.  See Field (2005b) for full discussion. 
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familiar to students of U.S. economic history.  A few of them warrant further comment.  
Starting with the most recent period and working backward, 1989 was the last full year of 
expansion before the downturn; the same was true for 2000.  Many analysts of the recent 
productivity boom prefer to measure from 1995 to 2000, because there was a clear break 
in the series at mid decade, and it makes the acceleration of productivity growth at the 
end of the century look somewhat more dramatic.  In Table 1 below I also report growth 
over this shorter period, although it is questionable whether we should be choosing our 
time intervals with the objective of putting IT in its most favorable light. 
The period 1973-89 was of course the dark age of twentieth century U.S. growth, a 
sixteen year period in which the residual all but disappeared.  In contrast, 1948-73 was 
the golden age of labor productivity growth and living standard advance, during which 
output per hour in the private nonfarm economy grew at a continuously compounded rate 
of almost 3 percent per year, the arithmetic consequence of a still respectable rate of TFP 
advance and a revival (in comparison with the Depression period) of robust rates of 
capital accumulation and deepening.   
The choice of 1941 as a benchmark deserves further comment.  A number of 
economists have noted that it was the second quarter of the century that exhibited the 
highest rates of TFP growth in this country (Abramovitz and David, 1999; Gordon, 
2000b).  When growth accounting studies began, all that was then available for the 
twentieth century were data for its first two quarters.  In his 1957 article Solow analyzed 
data from 1909 to 1949, and the data underlying Abramovitz (1956) also extended for 
obvious reasons only through the first half of the century.  High TFP growth between 
1929 and 1948 underlay the Abramovitz/Solow conclusion that, in contrast with the 
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nineteenth century, a large gap had opened up in the twentieth century  between the 
growth of real output and the growth of inputs conventionally measured.   The large role 
of the residual was assumed a distinguishing feature of twentieth century growth in 
comparison to the nineteenth, and was expected to persist.  It did, at reduced rates, for 
another quarter of a century, but then almost disappeared from view after 1973.   
The remarkable 1929-48 TFP performance has almost uniformly been credited to 
innovation and learning by doing during the Second World War (see, e.g, Abramovitz, 
1986, p. 395).  I have argued instead that most of the foundations for postwar prosperity 
were already in place by 1941 (Field, 2003, 2005b.)  Simon Kuznets was probably the 
first fully to appreciate by exactly how much potential output had expanded during the 
Depression when he was tasked with estimating the U.S. economy’s production capacity 
in preparation for war mobilization.  The rise in capacity between 1929 and 1941 made it 
possible to place more than twelve million individuals in the active duty military, produce 
very large quantities of military material, and, by some measures, raise real consumption 
levels in the U.S. relative to Depression levels in spite of rationing and the unavailability 
of a number of consumer durables.   
The expansion of natural output prior to full scale war mobilization, not the 
experience of the war itself, established most of the foundations for postwar prosperity. 
At the same time it widened the gap between productivity levels in the U.S. in 
comparison with Europe or Japan. The successful exploitation of that gap, in turn, helps 
account for the very high postwar growth rates in those countries (Abramovitz, 1986) 
Ideally, as noted, we would like to restrict our growth calculations to peak to peak 
measures.  1941 is the closest we come to full employment before full scale war 
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mobilization.  Unemployment was still 9.9 percent, as compared with 3.2 percent in 
1929.  In retrospect, it would have been helpful for the purposes of my argument had the 
attack on Pearl Harbor been delayed by eight to twelve months, so that the U.S. economy 
could have continued its then rapid return to full employment prior to mobilization.  But 
as a peacetime peak to peak measure, 1941 is superior to 1937, the year that Kendrick 
used for his benchmark calculations, with 14.3 percent unemployment, and it is superior 
to 1940, at 14.6 percent unemployment. And it is far superior to 1938, with its 19 percent 
unemployment rate.   
Empirical Analysis 
Table 1 below reports TFP growth, output per hour growth, and output per adjusted 
hour growth for each of the six periods identified.9  The pre-1948 numbers are calculated 
from appendices in Kendrick (1961) – the starting point for all modern work on the first 
half of the century.  Post 1948 growth rates are calculated from data available on the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics website. In Field (2003, 2005a,b and 2006a,b) I discuss some 
of the sectoral underpinnings of these growth rates in different time periods, as well as 
some of the qualifications one must make in interpreting estimates of  TFP growth. 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
For the purposes of this paper, we can focus on the numbers themselves rather than 
the nuances in their interpretation, since the equipment hypothesis claims, without a great 
deal of nuance, that high rates of equipment investment will be associated with high rates 
of TFP growth.  While, for given rates of capital deepening, higher TFP growth rates will 
mean higher growth in output per hour, it makes more sense in evaluating the hypothesis 
                                                 
9 A comparison of the second and third column of Table 1, which adjusts labor input to take account of 
quality changes, provides a rough measure of the significance of human capital changes in accounting for 
the change in output per hour.   
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to focus on TFP directly, rather than the output per hour or output per capita measures 
that are the dependent variable in the DeLong and Summers studies. As Figure 1 (based 
on data in the first column of Table 1) makes visually apparent, for the last eighty years 
of the twentieth century, TFP growth rates in the United States trended generally 
downward. 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
To consider the applicability of the equipment hypothesis to U.S. economic 
experience, we now need to examine relative and absolute trends in equipment capital 
formation.  For these purposes, I have constructed series for the real net stock of both 
equipment and structures from data in the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ Fixed Asset 
Tables.  These tables contain the most authoritative numbers available for the United 
States private and public capital stock and its components.10   
  The BEA provides estimates in current dollars of components of private and 
government capital stocks from 1925 onwards.  It also provides chained index numbers 
for the components of the real net stock starting in 1925.  From these index numbers, 
growth rates of the individual components can be calculated.  And from the current dollar 
estimates of the net stocks, ratios of components can be constructed for any particular 
year.   But since these ratios are based on current year prices, their use presents problems 
if comparisons are made over time.  For example, if the real net stock of structures is 
growing at a steady rate but real equipment investment (and the net stock) is growing 
more rapidly during a period in which the relative price of equipment is falling, one could 
                                                 
10 For reasons that are mystifying the BEA no longer makes them easily accessible, but as of late 2005, they 
could still be accessed at  http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/dn/FAweb/Index2002.htm. 
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in principle register no change in the current dollar ratio of the net stocks of the two 
components. 
To address this problem, I start with chained indexes, and rescale them using 
multiplicative constants so that the 1925 index (rather than 1996) equals 100.  I then 
obtain series for the real net equipment and structures stock as the product of this 
transformed index number and the 1925 current dollar start value.  Because the growth of 
the chain index between two years is based on a geometric average of the differences in 
levels calculated using current and prior year prices, it provides a measure intermediate in 
value between a Laspeyres and a Paasche index of growth of an asset component.  It 
provides a reasonable solution to the index number problem in an environment when the 
relative prices of some components of the Fixed Asset stock, such as equipment, were 
falling. 11 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Figure 2 plots the logged value of the real net stocks of the main components of 
private nonresidential fixed assets.  A first conclusion is that there is no clear trend in the 
equipment stock between 1925 and 1944.    The real net stock of equipment rose 
moderately between 1925 and 1929, declined sharply through 1935, and then rose 
moderately through 1944.  The net equipment stock was lower in 1941 than it was in 
1929.   
                                                 
11 A real growth rate calculated using a Laspeyres price index, using base period prices, will arguably 
overstate rates of increase when some components are declining in price and increasing in quantity; a 
Paasche index using end period prices will arguably understate real growth in the same situation.  This is 
the basic index number problem.  A Fisher chained volume index is a geometric average of a Laspeyres 
real volume index and a Paasche real volume index.  That is, it multiplies the two indexes together and 
takes the square root of their product. 
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Starting in 1945 and continuing through the end of the century, the equipment stock 
has grown, sharply between 1945 and 1948 as GOPO (government owned, privately 
operated)  equipment capital was sold off to the private sector, more slowly through 
1962, more rapidly through 1980, somewhat more slowly through 1992, and then 
somewhat more rapidly again through 2001.  These accelerations and decelerations are 
minor, however, compared with the main feature of this series:  the absence of trend 
between 1925 and 1944 followed by steady rise at a rate of 5.01 percent per year 
thereafter. Figure 2 establishes that the accelerated growth of the equipment stock, both 
absolutely and as a share of private fixed capital, was not a new development in the 
1990s, but rather represented continuation of a trend that began as the Second World War 
came to an end. 
The real net stock of structures series traces out a similar pattern, although the post 
World War II growth is less than half as rapid:  2.43 percent per year between 1945 and 
2001. The real net stock of private nonresidential structures rose between 1925 and 1931, 
and then trended downward slightly through 1945, before also embarking on its  
relatively steady growth path after the war, albeit one that was more moderate in 
comparison with that exhibited by equipment.  These different growth rates are, of 
course, the cause of the rise in the ratio of equipment to structures in the postwar period. 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Using the data summarized in Table 2 we can explore the two propositions that lie 
at the core of the equipment hypothesis.  The first is a claim of a positive relationship 
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between the growth of the real net equipment stock and the growth of total factor 
productivity.12    
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
Figure 3 is a scatter plot of the data in columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 (for the 1919-
29 period, I can only calculate the annual rate of growth of the equipment stock from 
1925 on).  If one takes a quick look at the data in Figure 3, one might say that its closest 
resemblance is to a very large question mark, and that is what the data underlying it 
suggest with respect to the equipment hypothesis. The highest rate of TFP growth (1929-
41) coincides with growth in the real equipment stock.  The period exhibiting the highest 
rate of growth of the real equipment stock, 1941-48, the consequence of a huge 
government financed infusion of machine tools and other equipment,13 shows 
substantially lower TFP growth than the interwar period in its entirety, and much lower 
growth than the twelve year period immediately preceding, when equipment growth was 
negative.  What ultimately underlies the lack of a positive relationship in the scatter plot 
is the fact that the upward movement in real equipment investment, which began after the 
Second World War, and is evident in Figure 2, coincided with the downward drift in TFP 
growth for the private nonfarm economy evident in Figure 1. 
 The lack of a positive relationship in Figure 3 is confirmed econometrically. Since 
the units of analysis here are periods, and since the data points reflect growth rates over 
these periods, there are only six observations for each of these scatter plots.  If one 
                                                 
12 De Long and Summers state that the hypothesis involve rates of gross equipment investment and growth 
in output per hour, but it is impossible to have an increase in the real net stock without persisting flows of 
gross investment.   Changes in the stock will obviously be closely related to levels of the flows. 
13 This equipment was initially in GOPO (Government Owned, Privately Operated) plants.  But by 1948 it 
was largely under private ownership, the major exception being synthetic rubber capacity, which was kept 
in government hands until the mid 1950s. 
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regresses TFP growth on the growth of the real equipment stock, the coefficient on 
growth of the equipment stock is negative, although insignificantly different from 0: 
                          TFPGROWTH   =   2.17   -  .193 * EQGROWTH. 
 
                           R2 = .26; n = 6      (3.20)   (-1.21) (t stats in parentheses) 
 
I am not arguing that this equation shows that more rapid growth of the equipment 
stock negatively impacts TFP growth.  I am arguing that there is absence of evidence of a 
systematic positive relationship in this data, which reflects eight decades of twentieth 
century U.S. economic history.  
Another interpretation of the equipment hypothesis would suggest the need to 
correct for growth in the overall size of the economy:  According to this interpretation, 
TFP growth should advance more rapidly when high levels of equipment investment  
cause the growth of the net stock to exceed the growth of real output.   Column 4 of Table 
2 shows the results of subtracting the growth rate of private nonfarm economy output 
(column 3) from the growth rate of the real net equipment stock (column 2), in other 
words the growth rate of the equipment/output ratio.  Figure 4 plots the relationship of 
this measure to TFP growth. 
FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
The data reflect the fact that the interwar years, and particularly 1929-41, were 
years in which the capital output ratio fell, and this was true for equipment capital as well 
as the fixed capital aggregate (another way of looking at it is that these were years of 
sharp increases in capital productivity).  The absence of a positive relationship between 
this measure of equipment investment and TFP growth is even more apparent than was 
the case in Figure 3.  Regressing the TFP growth rate on the rate of growth of the 
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equipment to output ratio yields a negative coefficient on the right hand variable 
although, with five degrees of freedom, it is not quite statistically significant.14 
   TFPGROWTH   =   1.63   -  .331  * EQ/OUTPUTGROWTH. 
 
                           R2 = .57; n = 6        (6.67)   (-2.32) (t stats in parentheses) 
 
The Asymmetry Claim 
The second key element of the equipment hypothesis is the asserted asymmetry 
between the respective abilities of growth in the equipment and the structures capital 
stock to stimulate total factor productivity growth.  Column 5 of Table 2 reports, for each 
of the six periods in question, the average ratio of equipment to structures over the 
period.  These are calculated using the series on real net stocks of equipment and 
structures whose generation is described above (again, I can only use 1925-1929 for the 
1919-29 period).  Figure 5 is a scatter plot of these data. Once again, there is an absence 
of a positive relationship between the average equipment to structures ratio and TFP 
growth in the private nonfarm economy: 
                            
   TFPGROWTH   =   2.48   -  .176 * EQ/STRUCTAVG. 
 
                           R2 = .66; n = 6       (5.88)     (-2.81) (t stats in parentheses) 
 
 Here there is modest evidence of a negative relationship.  The lowest ratio of 
equipment to structures occurs during the period of highest TFP growth (1929-1941).  
The highest ratio of equipment to structures (1989-2000) is associated with the second 
lowest TFP growth rate.  
                                                 
14 One might argue that it takes substantial time for equipment investment to affect TFP growth rates.  But 
the relationship between TFP growth and growth rates of the equipment capital stock (Figure 3) or the 
equipment/structures ratio (Figure 4) and one period later are no more favorable to the equipment 
hypothesis. 
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FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE 
De Long and Summers “see no reason to expect that investments in structures 
should carry with them the same external effects as plausibly attach to investments in 
equipment” (1991, p. 480).  But they don’t provide evidence in support of this assertion – 
it is assumed to be so obvious as not to require any.   Innovations in building design can, 
however, have significant impacts on within plant productivity, perhaps most notably in 
the United States during the 1920s in manufacturing.  
During that period the net stock of private nonresidential structures was more than 
three times that of private equipment, and the revolution in factory design associated with 
the extraordinary TFP gains within manufacturing (5.12 percent per year between 1919 
and 1929), depended upon investments in new single story factory structures. Although 
some of the contemporaneous  TFP gains could be indirectly linked to prior advances in 
electric power generating machinery, much was the result of learning by doing and 
discovery of improved factory layout once the straightjacket of mechanical internal 
distribution of power was removed and the new plants constructed (see Devine, 1983; 
David and Wright, 2003; Field, 2005a).  
And for the economy as a whole, large scale investment in government structures 
such as streets and highways can stimulate TFP growth in using sectors, as was likely 
true during the Depression years (Field, 2005a, 2006b), and as Aschauer (1989) has 
argued for the postwar period.  It is interesting to contrast the effects of the boom in street 
and highway and other infrastructure construction during the 1930s with the rather 
different government financed capital formation boom that took place during the 1940s.  
The latter effort poured more than $10 billion of taxpayer money into GOPO 
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(Government Owned Privately Operated) plants.  Almost all of this infusion was in 
manufacturing, and a large part of it went for equipment, particularly machine tools, in 
such strategic sectors as aluminum, synthetic rubber, aircraft engines, and aviation fuel 
refining (Gordon, 1969).15 The immediate consequence was that TFP growth in 
manufacturing went negative, retarding TFP advance for the private nonfarm economy as 
a whole.16  
To be fair to the equipment hypothesis, one might object that it implicitly requires 
that the machinery be allocated by private markets, rather than government central 
planners.  Robert Higgs (1992) has argued that output growth in the war years was 
overstated,17 and would probably attribute the poor TFP showing in manufacturing 
between 1941 and 1948 to the fact that it was public equipment investment rather than 
that it was public equipment investment.  The beneficial impact of street and highway 
construction in the 1930s should, however, caution us against dismissing on a priori 
grounds the potential growth enhancing benefits of public infrastructure spending. 
Conclusion  
The generality of the equipment hypothesis, repeatedly reaffirmed by de Long and 
Summers, is therefore in doubt.  Taking a broad overview of eight decades of twentieth 
century U.S. economic growth, there is absence of evidence of a systematic positive 
relationship between rates of equipment investment and TFP growth. The end of century 
surge in equipment investment, much of it IT related, did coincide with an accelerated 
                                                 
15 Most of this was then sold off to the private sector after the war, the main reason that 1941-48 shows the 
highest growth of the real net equipment stock. 
16  TFP growth in manufacturing declined from the 2.60 percent per year experienced between 1929 and 
1941 to -.52 percent per year registered between 1941 and 1948 (see Field, 2005b).   
17 This overstatement, to the degree that it took place, should not, however, affect calculations over the 
1941-48 interval. 
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growth in output per hour, above and beyond what one would have expected from the 
capital deepening alone. Taking a longer historical view, however, the IT productivity 
boom is less striking. The acceleration, though marked, produced a growth rate of the 
residual dwarfed by what took place during the Depression years, when there was a 
substantial increase in public infrastructure, but declines in the net stocks of private 
structures and equipment, or during the 1920s, when the ratio of structures to equipment 
was almost four times what it is today (see Figure 2).  
To the degree that the mechanism identified in the equipment hypothesis is 
operative, its importance must vary across particular sectors and particular epochs or else 
be swamped by the effect of other influences.  The problem for policy makers in favoring 
one type of investment over another is that it is quite difficult to determine ex ante, at any 
specific historical moment, which type (private structures, public infrastructure, private 
equipment) will have the biggest long term impact on TFP.  The economic history of the 
United States in the twentieth century suggests that that there is nothing inherent in the 
category of equipment investment warranting a presumptive bias in its favor. To assume 
or conclude otherwise, and to base policy on this presumption, either in developing 
countries or in those aspiring to become so, entails the same risks as adopting industrial 
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